[First published on Free Life.]

Politicians and mainstream economists are persistent in their warning of the so-called “deflation danger” – the idea that falling prices are calamitous for economic progress and that a perpetual, ceaseless price inflation is needed in order to bring us back to prosperity. Often, a deflation figure as small as 0.6% seems to be sufficient to trigger alarm – something of an hilarious travesty when, regardless of the merits of the deflation thesis, this figure amounts to little more than a rounding error.

The typical argument against deflation runs something like this: with continuous price deflation people expect prices to be lower tomorrow than they are today so that, as a result, they put off their purchases until a later date. This, in turn, causes prices to fall further and further and so we end up in an endless downward spiral of depression and impoverishment. Inflating prices, however, cause people to buy today so that they may insulate themselves from future price rises, thus bringing about economic prosperity and an increase in the standard of living.

The term “deflation” is used, quite confusingly, to refer to two different economic phenomena:

Although the two phenomena are related by the commonality of falling prices, the causes and effects of each are distinct and, as such, they must be treated separately. However, because of the bias of our current monetary system towards perpetual inflation it is usually the case that a general price deflation occurs only during monetary crises – i.e. the second cause of deflation. The supposedly negative effects of such deflations, which are often characterised by sharp, persistent falls in prices, are used, quite carelessly, to demonise the first type of price deflation as well so we end up with the notion that any prices falling for whatever reason are a bad thing.

The first type - secular deflation - occurs because an increase in the supply of goods relative to the supply of money causes the prices of those goods to fall gradually. It should be clear to everyone that such falling prices are the result of economic prosperity, permitting us to gradually buy more and more with the same amount of money. Hence, they are not an economic burden and any anti-deflationary thesis seeking to counteract these price falls is absurd.

The notion that people will suddenly “stop buying” during such a deflation in order to defer purchases to a later date when prices are expected to be lower is ridiculous. Every businessman will tell you that if you lower prices people will buy more whereas if you raise them people will buy less – precisely the opposite of the deflation thesis.

Goods are evaluated for the ends that they meet. The fulfilment of these ends, as a result of the logic of human action, cannot be put off indefinitely and each individual will have to consume at some point. Applying a reductio ad absurdum, the deflation thesis suggests that falling prices will cause people to starve because they will always be waiting for lower food prices in the future.

To give an actual example, although general, secular price deflation is highly unlikely under our present, paper money regimes, it can still be observed in specific industries – particularly in personal technology, such as computers and mobile phones, where productivity increases translate into price decreases in spaces of time short enough to counteract the general trend of price inflation. And yet these falling prices have not caused the collapse of this sector precisely because, however much you expect prices to fall, the value of owning a more expensive computer today is greater than that of waiting for a less expensive one in, say, three years. In other words, even if a person knows that a computer costs £1,000 today but will cost only half as much in three years, he will still spend £1,000 today if the benefit to be derived from the computer today is more valuable than saving £500 and waiting three years for that benefit.

Another daft argument is the idea that falling prices will cause business revenues, in turn, to fall, thus slashing profits and causing investment to slump. However, the success of a business – measured by its profit – depends not only upon the height of its revenue but also upon the height of its costs. The prices businesses are prepared to pay for their costs today is based upon what they expect the prices of their outputs to be tomorrow. Thus, gradually falling selling prices will transform into gradually falling costs and so profit margins will still exist.

It is, in fact, inflation that serves to damage (or at least falsify) profits at the expense of investment. The accounting practice of depreciating an asset over its useful life serves to set aside a portion of the revenue for eventual replacement of the asset. If depreciation charges are made at the old price of the asset while the replacement cost has, in the meantime, risen then this fund will clearly be inadequate. The opposite is true when prices fall – the fund will be able to afford more investment than a simple replacement of the worn out asset.

However, the bigger flaw in the theory of the deflation worriers is that it is based on the false, “consumptionist” view of economic progress – that the driver of prosperity is consumers spending increasing amounts of their money on more and more rubbish. As “Austrians”, however, we know that prosperity derives from the abstinence of consumption in favour of saving and investing, which, in turn, results from lower time preference rates. Yet that is precisely what happens if a person defers his consumption from today to tomorrow in order to take advantage of lower prices that are only available tomorrow. (Preferring the same quantity of goods in the future at a lower price is of the same ilk as preferring a higher quantity of goods in the future at the same price). Thus, there will be more resources available for investment in longer and more complex production processes resulting in a boost to economic progress. Inflating in order to make people consume more, however, will have the opposite effect.

The second type of deflation – that resulting from a monetary contraction – is of a somewhat different nature. Here, the problem is that a reduction in the supply of money will cause the prices of dollar quoted assets to fall while dollar denominated debts that have been taken on to fund those assets will remain at their previous value. Thus, there will be a cascade of defaults, bankruptcies, job losses, etc. that will, so it is alleged, cause endless destitution and misery. As we noted earlier, this nearly always happens at the start of the "bust" phase of the business cycle, when monetary inflation has stopped and higher interest rates have served to cut off cheap borrowing.

To anyone with even a rudimentary understanding of the “Austrian” theory of the business cycle, this anti-deflationism is clearly nothing more than a case of special pleading on behalf of the banks and businesses that borrowed cheap money in order to plough it into inflating assets (such as sub-prime mortgages) during the boom. They cry out for a vigorous re-inflation so that their particular firms do not have to suffer liquidation and their chief executives do not have to sell their mansions and yachts.

This type of deflation would not be a cause of a general economic malaise but would, in fact, serve to restructure the economy away from malinvestment by transferring the purchasing power of resources from those who borrowed and wasted during the boom to those who did not, the latter still holding a large quantity of steadily appreciating cash. Once that liquidation is complete the economy can proceed on a sound footing. This is precisely the argument of distinguished “Austrian” economist Jörg Guido Hülsmann in Deflation and Liberty.

Indeed, much of the deflation fear comes from the monetarist analysis of the Great Depression where there was, in fact, a real monetary contraction (although, as Murray Rothbard argues in America’s Great Depression, the lack of inflation did not result from want of trying, and that the actual cause of the contraction lay in factors that negated the inflationary responses of the government and the Federal Reserve). However, the stagnation during this era was not due to the deflation per se but because of the widespread attempt to keep wages and prices high in spite of the monetary contraction. Had prices been allowed to fall then recovery would have been much swifter.

Here we have, then, the real reason why we are supposed to be alarmed by the “deflation danger”. Deflation would cripple heavily indebted governments and banks who rely on a constant source of cheap money. The need for perpetual inflation is wholly unnecessary for economic prosperity and the wellbeing of the general public. Rather, it is necessitated by the asset-liability mix brought about by previous inflation which would threaten the existence of large, establishment institutions if it was to reverse. They need more cheap money, more theft of your purchasing power, in order to keep their phoney assets rising in value. The deflation myth, therefore, is nothing more than a part of the big, statist fraud, benefiting a select few at the expense of everybody else.

[First published on Free Life]

One of the mandates that our economic lords and masters have arrogated for themselves is that of maintaining so-called price stability, a constant purchasing power of the monetary unit in our wallets.

At first blush, price stability sounds rather appealing – not only does it “bless” us with the apparition of certainty but are we not also “protected” by the potential of higher prices in the future? If so we can assure ourselves that our cost of living will be sustained and manageable, relieved of the horror that the essential consumables may some day be out of our reach.

Unfortunately this ambition is not only disastrous for a complex economy but is also antithetical to the nature of human action in the first place. The whole purpose of economising action is to attempt to achieve more for less – to direct the scarce resources available to their most highly valued ends and to gain the highest possible outputs with the lowest possible inputs. In short, economic progress means that we are gradually able to attain more and more for the same amount of labour; or, to put it another way, we could attain the same quantity of goods for a lower amount of labour. Any consistent attempt to stabilise the prices in the economy would not only target the goods that we buy with our money but also the goods that we sell – and that, for most of us, means our labour! But if we cannot sell our labour for any more and if we cannot buy our wares for any less then it means that we will simply be locked into a repetitive cycle of working, buying, consuming and working again for the same prices for the whole of our lives with no improvement in the standard of living whatsoever. Instead of economic progress bringing goods at cheaper prices to the lowest earners, the only way to improve one’s wellbeing in such a world would be to become a higher earner – i.e. by working harder or longer.

Of course, real price stability never does and never can work in this way for it is impossible for a centralised authority to monitor and regulate all the many millions of individual prices and exchanges that occur every day in the economy. Instead, such authorities monitor and target the mythical pseudo-concept of the general “price level”, usually concocted by taking a selective index of goods – an index that can be altered conveniently in order to paint the data in the fashion desired. Individual prices within the index, however, may still fluctuate relative to each other even though the absolute price average may appear constant. This fact may not mean a great deal to the bureaucrat but is of great importance to the individuals who wish to purchase those particular goods. Furthermore, because of the belief that a dose of price inflation is good for a growing economy, “stability” usually tends to be defined as including some measure of price inflation such as the Bank of England’s 2% inflation target. We are apparently “stable” when the government is robbing your pay packet of some of its purchasing power, it seems.

Such a policy is not restricted to existing as a mere moderate tempering of an otherwise healthy and growing economy. Rather, it can have disastrous and deleterious effects upon the entire system. The outcome of a genuinely progressing economy with sound capital investment should be a gradual, secular price deflation where goods and services become cheaper over time. If central banks attempt to counter this in order to achieve stability it must lower interest rates and print more money in order to devalue the monetary unit relative to goods in order to prevent prices from falling. However such an act is what induces the ill-fated business cycle; prices may appear stable but the relative prices of capital goods will begin to rise and those of consumption goods to fall as the new money gets sucked into ultimately unsustainable investment projects.

This is precisely what happened in the 1920s when a high degree of productivity was countered by a voluminous expansion of credit that masked price rises, giving the illusion of price stability and suckering promoters of the scheme (such as Irving Fisher) into believing that they were living in a new era of permanent prosperity. The same was also true of the run up to the tech boom collapse at the turn of the century and the housing market collapse of 2008; these had been preceded by a period of low interest rates and apparently low price inflation – alleged hallmarks of an successful economy – that camouflaged the underlying distortions, leaving mainstream economists scratching their heads in confusion as to what went wrong.

Far from creating certainty and consistency, achieving “price stability” is one of the very worst horrors of a centralised, bureaucratically managed economy. Free market prices mean something - they result from the underlying supply and demand relationships so that goods are rationed to their most productive uses. Interfering in that process will only mean that, one way or another, valuable resources are wasted - with the most catastrophic waste occurring in the malinvestment of boom and bust.

Somewhat ironically, however, it is likely to be the free market that is characterised by relatively more stable prices than an economy burdened by the rollercoaster rides in asset prices caused by state induced inflation. Moreover, the existence of speculators – who gain a bad name in an environment of monetary inflation/deflation – would serve to prevent seasonal, irrational or capricious variations in prices and to smooth the transition between genuine price changes. No one, in other words, is likely to find that bread, cheese or milk costs twice as much today as they did yesterday.

Therefore, let us leave prices wholly to the free market so that we can create a genuinely stable and lasting economic prosperity.

[First published on Free Life]

One of the positive indicators of our so-called economic recovery bandied about not only in the media but also by our monetary lords and masters at the head of central banks is the idea that rising prices are a sign of economic recovery. This mistaken belief is part of a wider myth that views the economy as little more than a giant number – a number which, if going up, means things are good and getting better, and if going down means the situation is bad and getting worse.

Theoretically the market price for any good is never “good” or “bad”; it is simply a function of the supply and demand for that good. The only way in which we can say that the market price is “good” is that both parties to a transaction are satisfied with that price and, thus, both have received an increase in welfare as a result.

That aside, however, surely economic progress is marked by an increasing abundance of goods and services – that more and more stuff is being produced for each hour of work? Therefore, if goods and services are increasing in supply then shouldn’t this lead to decreasing prices rather than increasing prices? If so, then increasing prices must indicate the opposite – a decreasing supply of goods relative to the money used to buy them and, consequently, greater impoverishment.

Contrary to the “wisdom” of so-called experts, such facts are intuitive – stop any number of strangers in the supermarket and they will almost certainly tell you that they want everything on the shelves to be cheaper, not more expensive. They will tell you also that they would be better off if they could buy more with the money they have in their pockets rather than less. Thus it is a travesty for economists and talking heads to call for even a “modest” degree of price inflation unless they are keen to promote destitution. Such inflation means that those of us with fixed incomes are forced to sit by and watch the purchasing power of our wages drop, unable to continue to afford to buy things because the “recovering” prices put them out of our reach.

The “recovery” of rising prices is just as ridiculous when it refers to rising asset prices rather than consumer prices. This kind of “recovery” has nothing to do with whether life is getting better for Joe and Jane Average. Rather, it means that there has been a localised recovery and improvement for a select group of people – those who borrowed cheap money heavily during the boom (mostly the politically connected big banks and investment houses) and ploughed it into stocks, bonds, property, etc. They can now breathe a sigh of relief as the prices of those assets once again begin to rise with the new round of monetary inflation.

In the UK this can be seen most clearly in the specific arena of house prices. Rising house prices are great for those who already own houses, boosting their wealth and allowing them to take out second mortgages or other equity release schemes to finance increased spending on their lifestyles. At some point, however, the prices rise so much that purchasing a property becomes an almost impossible expense for those who are not yet on the so-called “property ladder”. Government schemes to help “first time buyers” simply exacerbate the situation as they permit more money to chase the existing stock of housing.

A general economic recovery is not based upon rising consumer or asset prices buoyed up by paper money. It is created by a sound monetary order that allows entrepreneurs to allocate resources to where they are most urgently desired by consumers and to, slowly but surely, increase the economy’s accumulation of capital goods. The result should be a gradual secular price deflation as more and more goods are produced, meaning that the money in the hands of the lowest earners gradually increases in value. Consequently, everyone grows wealthier and more prosperous instead of just the super rich.

[An Article from Free Life]

In a recent article for Free Life, I noted that, for me, the urge to pen a rebuttal to the work of others come not from trawling through the drivel of a statist, leftist or mainstream pundit. Rather, it comes in response to a libertarian who has spouted some piece of nonsense in spite of being in a position to know better. Today, we will address something similar of this ilk in the realm of economics from Alistair MacLeod, Head of Research at Goldmoney.

MacLeod produces detailed, well informed articles concerning the state of the global financial system, tracing its problems back to the existence of freely floating, paper currencies issued unilaterally by governments. While it often helps to have something of a technical understanding of finance and banking in order to comprehend some of the details, he is a clear advocate of a “sound” money standard based upon gold and silver, going at lengths to explain why he believes such standards lie in our future. For those fond of cryptocurrency, MacLeod may prove to be something of a disappointment – he is not a fan, nor, needless to say, does he have any faith in central bank digital currencies. However, this stance is probably to be expected from an analyst working for an investment firm specialising in precious metals.

He is also clearly familiar with the Austrian School of Economics, offering, in one of his recent articles, this brief summary of the Austrian attitude towards fractional reserve banking:

We might note that, strictly speaking, Austrian economists do not advocate the banning of anything. Economics is a value free science; its practitioners can tell you what the effects of a certain policy will be, but whether that policy should be either embraced or rejected requires a value judgment. This is not pedantry on my part; the mis-categorisation of economic and monetary policies as mere scientific or technical matters which should be in the hands of “experts” has played an enormous role in sheltering them from public scrutiny. Indeed, it is merely another version of the “follow the science” mantra that was used to justify lockdowns and social distancing during COVID-19. Apart from that, however, MacLeod makes a reasonable summary of what most Austro-libertarians believe should be the case. Depositors of money in a bank for safekeeping should retain 100% title to their money and pay a fee to that bank for custodian services. They can withdraw their money for spending at any time. However, those wishing to lend their funds to borrowers in order to earn an interest return would deposit their money under different arrangements. The depositor would transfer title over the money to the bank (thus becoming a creditor of the bank) for an agreed period of time. The bank would then use that money to make loans to borrowers, paying back the funds (together with the interest credit) to the depositor on the date the agreed duration of the loan comes to an end (usually referred to as the “maturity date”). Critically, during the period of the loan, the depositor would not be able to access the funds, at least not without incurring a penalty. Under this set of circumstances, there would be no unfunded expansion of bank credit.

Unfortunately, MacLeod follows this up with this strange paragraph:

MacLeod seems to be of the opinion that the entirety of investment, production and economic progress would grind to a halt if banks were not able to advance loans to borrowers through unfunded credit expansion. In other words, for him, such expansion is a positive thing, becoming a problem only if it is done to excess. This attitude is reflected in his proposed “solution”, which we will address later.

MacLeod does not explain the theoretical basis for this view, so I won’t speculate on where this might lie (and there are many possible options). It is, however, utterly erroneous. In fact, as we shall see, not only can economic progress proceed without unfunded credit expansion, but it is vital that all such expansion is eliminated if we ever wish to have a stable currency and long term prosperity devoid of boom and bust. The remainder of this article will be devoted to demonstrating why this is so.

In response to large profits posted by BP and Shell, the UK government is considering a so-called “windfall” tax on oil and gas companies. The aim of this measure is to redistribute, to consumers, the proceeds from those profits so as to ease the burden of the spiralling retail cost of fuel and heating.

In a free market, a sudden rise in price in response to an influx of demand – usually due to an equally sudden change in circumstances, such as a natural disaster – can, indeed, furnish handsome profits to companies which happened to purchase their inputs while prices were still low. Ordinarily, this would serve as a signal to entrepreneurs that there is a grave shortage of capacity in that particular industry, relative to the height of demand. Such entrepreneurs would then rush to expand their investment in the industry, increasing production of the heavily demanded commodity so that its price could be brought down again. Indeed, it is likely that the initial, extraordinary profits – rather than being distributed to shareholders to be spent on mansions and yachts – will be the first source of that fresh investment. Such profits are, therefore, of a benefit to the consumer, but it is also worth noting that they are just as temporary as high, consumer prices. Increased investment in the industry will have the effect of raising the cost of inputs while lowering that of outputs, shrinking profits back to relatively “normal” levels.

A windfall tax, however, would completely destroy this important incentive mechanism. By robbing the companies of those profits, the opposite signal is sent to entrepreneurs and investors: stay away from this industry or your returns will be confiscated! With no fresh investment forthcoming, that industry then struggles to cope with meeting the increased demand through its existing capacity, the only consequence of which can be scarcity and permanently high prices. The proceeds of the tax itself can, at best, provide only temporary relief - and that is assuming that the government doesn’t find some way of wasting the money completely.

Further, in the case of oil and gas, the reason why large profits cannot be used to expand capacity as efficiently as they otherwise could be is because of green-centric government policies that make it difficult to do so. In fact, for the past generation or so, the strategy of governments towards so-called “climate change” has generally consisted of running down the existing fossil fuel infrastructure while throwing subsidies at inferior alternatives such as wind farms. We are now feeling the squeeze as the dilapidated capacity that remains is struggling to cope.

Another destructive mechanism that governments often resort to in these situations is price fixing, although price ceilings are normally applied directly to consumer goods rather than to capital goods. The initial effect here is to stop any kind of extraordinary profits from being made in the first place. The long term consequence, however, will be the same: desperately needed investment in a vital industry stays away.

The only solution to the rising cost of energy is to get governments out of the business of energy entirely, so that companies are able to deploy resources freely to where they are most demanded. In tandem, governments will need to cease all of their activities which are causing the inflationary pressure in the first place, namely: the incessant printing of money, and their geopolitical adventurism that has wrecked supply chains still reeling from the insane COVID lockdowns.